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NOTES & COMMENTS
A Flawed System Exposed: The Immigration
Adjudicatory System and Asylum
for Sexual Minorities
Debate over immigration policy and immigration law has taken on
an unprecedented prominence for the American body politic in recent
years. The growing clout and numeric prominence of the nation's
Latino community, which now constitutes 12.5 percent of the popula-
tion, has not gone unnoticed by politicians.' Indeed, both the Republi-
can and Democratic parties have sought to portray themselves as
friendly to Latinos and to issues that resonate with Latino voters, and the
parties have expended enormous efforts to heighten their appeal to this
segment of the voting population.2 Given that most Latino voters have
relatively recent roots in the United States, immigration is a prominent
concern for most of these newer Americans; many theorize that the col-
lapse of the California Republican Party stems from its rejection by
Latino voters still infuriated at the party's support for anti-illegal immi-
grant Proposition 187. 3 Indeed, President George W. Bush and Mexican
President Vicente Fox seemed almost certain to negotiate some type of
regularization program for workers illegally present in the United States
(or at least undocumented Mexican workers) before the tragic events of
September 11, 2001, intervened. 4
Largely due to concerns about international terrorism and the abil-
ity of foreign nationals to infiltrate the U.S. borders in the wake of the 9-
11 attacks, immigration has had an uncharacteristically high profile in
the American political landscape. In recent months, two courts of
appeals have issued conflicting opinions on the legality of closed depor-
1. THE NEW YORK TIMES 2003 ALMANAC 271 (John W. Wright ed., 2002).
2. See Deborah Barfield Berry, A Record Amount Spent on Latino Voters, NEWSDAY, Nov.
23, 2002, at A12; V. Dion Haynes, Parties Invest Time, Money to Woo Hispanic Voting Blocs,
CHI. TRIBUNE, Nov. 1, 2002, at 16; Deborah Kong, Hispanic Voters Resist Party Loyalty, AP
ONLINE, Nov. 8, 2002; John Pain, Bush, McBride Battle for Hispanic Voters, TALL. DEM., Oct. 29,
2002, at 6.
3. See Harold Meyerson, A State of Change: California's Tilt Toward the Left, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 2002, at MI.
4. See Kevin Sullivan & Glenn Kessler, Fox Says It's Time to Reopen Talks on Immigration
Concerns; Senior U.S. Delegation Gives Mexico No Signal of Action Soon, WASH. POST, Nov. 27,
2002, at A 12.
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tation hearings for aliens suspected of being involved in terrorism. 5 The
Third Circuit backed the Bush Administration's policy to employ closed
hearings while the Sixth Circuit disagreed, holding that the First Amend-
ment rights of the press and the public will not permit the blanket clo-
sure of all deportation hearings for suspected terrorist supporters.6 On
another front, Hady Hassan Omar, a Muslim Egyptian immigrant mar-
ried to a U.S. citizen, has filed suit in the Western District of Louisiana,
alleging that his 73-day detention immediately following 9-11 consti-
tuted mistreatment.7 Additionally, in an effort to shift the U.S. focus on
immigration from suspected Muslim terrorists back to loyal Latin
undocumented workers and remind President Bush of his commitment
to immigration reform, many argue that Mexico made full use of its seat
on the United Nations Security Council to force a compromise, rather
than meekly back the initial, more bellicose U.S. draft resolution.8
Sadly, while more prominence has been accorded to immigration
and immigration law in the national psyche than is typical, a fundamen-
tal truth remains. Immigration law remains a distinctly different entity
when compared to the other branches of American jurisprudence. Writ-
ing in 1984, Peter Schuck noted, "Immigration has long been a maver-
ick, a wild card, in our public law. Probably no other area of American
law has been so radically insulated and divergent from those fundamen-
tal norms of constitutional right, administrative procedure, and judicial
role that animate the rest of our legal system."9 Schuck's comments are
equally applicable today, for immigration law retains its status as a
branch of the law where the typical norms of precedents, due process
and judicial review operate only constrainedly. A study by Deborah
Anker attacked the process employed to adjudicate asylum claims, not-
ing that asylum applicants fail to receive fair and uniform treatment.10
Given the importance that immigration and immigration-related issues
play in today's legal, political, and social environment, the glaring
5. See North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002); Detroit
Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). See also Adam Liptak, A Court Backs Open
Hearings on Deportation: Secrecy May Be Sought Case by Case, It Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27,
2002, at Al; Adam Liptak & Robert Hanley, Citing 9/11, Appeals Court Upholds Secret
Hearings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2002, at A].
6. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 711; North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 220-21.
7. See Matthew Brzezinski, Hady Hassan Omar's Detention, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct.
27, 2002, at 50; Dan Eggen, 9/11 Detainee Files Lawsuit; Egyptian Arrested Sept. 12 Alleges
Mistreatment, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2002, at A01.
8. See Niko Price, Mexico Becomes Player in Iraq Debate, AP ONLINE, Nov. 6, 2002.
9. Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1
(1984).
10. See Deborah Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case Study on
the Inplementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment, 19 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 433, 447-48 (1992).
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weaknesses within the immigration adjudicatory system need to be
exposed and corrected.
Among the worst of these faults is the marked lack of precedent
that is generated by the immigration courts. While the hallmark of the
common law system is the respect for precedent and stare decisis, few, if
any, of the decisions that emerge from the immigration courts are pub-
lished, and these decisions therefore carry minimal precedential value. I
As a consequence, little precedent exists to guide immigration judges in
their decisions, and cases with markedly the same facts that theoretically
should merit similar results often end with dissimilar resolutions.
Immigration law is federal law, and, theoretically, the outcome of
an alien's case should not depend on his or her location in the country. 2
However, the courts of appeals have marked out strikingly different
positions on aspects of immigration law, and the Supreme Court is the
only single body capable of resolving these splits. 3 The Supreme Court
has, however, tended to decide relatively few immigration cases, and
conflicts between the circuits thus linger for long periods. 4
This Comment attempts to expose the twin problems of the lack of
precedent and appellate court conflict within the immigration law by
highlighting such problems as they affect a smaller subset of the case
law, namely the law governing asylum for sexual minorities. 5 The
Comment will begin by discussing briefly the structure of the immigra-
tion courts and then will detail the general definitions and procedures for
making a claim for asylum in the United States. Next, the Comment
will discuss the basic law underlying asylum for sexual minorities spe-
cifically, and then will address how the lack of precedent and conflicts
between the circuits have injected uncertainty into the decisional pro-
cess. The Comment will conclude with thoughts on how to rectify the
problem.
11. T. David Parish, Membership in a Particular Social Group under the Refugee Act of
1980: Social Identity and the Legal Concept of the Refugee, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 923, 950 n.152
(1992).
12. Immigration law is governed by the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 101-
507 (2002). Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), held that states are preempted from
enacting immigration legislation since federal law fully occupies the field.
13. See, e.g., Fatima Mohyuddin, United States Asylum Law in the Context of Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity: Justice for the Transgendered?, 12 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 387
(2001) (noting the conflict over what constitutes membership in a particular social group).
14. See Kevin R. Johnson, Responding to the "Litigation Explosion": The Plain Meaning of
Executive Branch Primacy over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REV. 413, 416 n.5 (1991) (noting that,
while the Court decided four immigration cases in the 1991 term, it only decided seven cases
during 1971 to 1981).
15. In employing the term "sexual minority," the author intends to refer to all persons whose
sexual orientation is not exclusively heterosexual or is perceived not to be exclusively
heterosexual by his or her society.
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A. THE STRUCTURE OF THE IMMIGRATION COURTS
For most of the nation's history, no separate cadre of immigration
judges existed apart from the pool of bureaucrats designated as immigra-
tion officers; the more senior, experienced officers were simply desig-
nated to conduct the various immigration hearings.1 6 Indeed, until 1996,
immigration judges were still statutorily labeled "special inquiry
officers."1 7 Beginning in the 1950s, however, attitudes began to change,
and the perception began to take root that responsibilities for conducting
hearings should be divorced from responsibilities for enforcement. 8
Special inquiry officers were required to hold law degrees after 1956,
and, while still officially labeled special inquiry officers by statute, a
1973 regulation marked the official change of designation from mere
officer to immigration judge.' 9
The division between immigration judges and all other officials
working on immigration, and the corresponding division between
enforcement and judicial process, was greatly enhanced in 1983 with the
creation of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).2 ° The
creation of the EOIR removed the immigration judges from the purview
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and created a sepa-
rate agency within the Department of Justice, composed of the immigra-
tion judges, that was not answerable to anyone within the INS." Along
with the creation of the EOIR came the issuance of administrative proce-
dure designed to standardize operating practices, which had previously
varied widely from office to office. 2 In 1992, the EOIR employed
about 85 immigration judges, while, in 2001, the number had climbed to
slightly more than 200.23 Immigration judges are empowered to render
their decisions orally or in writing. 4 The creation of the Department of
Homeland Security has not affected the status of the EOIR, which will
remain housed in the Department of Justice. 5
An alien who is found removable by an immigration judge has a
16. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND
POLICY 254 (4th ed. 1998) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP].
17. Id.
18. Id. at 254-55.
19. Id. at 255.
20. Id. at 256.
21. Id.
22. Id. See also 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.12-3.42 (2003).
23. IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, supra note 16, at 256. See also THOMAS ALEXANDER
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., 2001 SUPPLEMENT TO IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY
22 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 SUPPLEMENT].
24. 8 C.F.R. §3.37(a) (2003).
25. While the EOIR remains unaffected, INS has been divided into three separate bureaus
housed within Homeland Security. See Alfonso Chardy, INS Down to Its Last Days: U.S.
Promises Better Security and Efficiency, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 24, 2003, at IA.
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right of appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). 26  The
ancestor of the BIA, the Board of Review, was created in 1921 when the
Department of Labor held responsibility for immigration matters.27 In
1940, when immigration affairs were transferred to the Department of
Justice, regulations were promulgated officially designating the BIA as
such and giving the body the power to issue final orders on immigration
appeals.2 8 The BIA originally was constituted with five members, but
its membership has grown to twenty-one in recognition of its increasing
caseload. 29 An individual member of the BIA is authorized to affirm
decisions of the immigration judges without opinion if he or she deter-
mines that the result is correct, that "any errors in the decision were
harmless or nonmaterial," that "the issue on appeal is squarely con-
trolled by existing Board or federal court precedent," and that the "ques-
tions raised on appeal are so insubstantial" that review by a three-
member panel is unnecessary.1° If a three-member panel does hear the
appeal, the panel's decision must be issued in writing.3' However, not
every written opinion of the BIA is accorded precedential value. BIA
decisions, whether of a three-member panel or of the Board sitting en
banc, constitute precedent for "all proceedings involving the same issue
or issues" only when designated as such by a majority vote of the per-
manent members of the BIA; the Attorney General may also overrule
any decision of the BIA.2
Should the BIA's decision prove unfavorable to the alien, he or she
may seek relief in the federal courts.33 Section 242 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act sets rather limited bases for federal court review of
the decisions of the BIA. Importantly for asylum seekers, the Attorney
General's decision whether to grant that discretionary form of relief is
deemed "conclusive unless manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse
of discretion."34 If his or her appeal to the Court of Appeal is success-
ful, however, that court's decision is binding on the BIA and immigra-
tion judges only for cases that arise in the states in that circuit.3 5 Only a
26. 8 C.F.R. §3.1(b) (2003).
27. IMMIGRATION AND CTIZENSHIP, supra note 16, at 257.
28. Id.
29. See id. See also 2001 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 23, at 22.
30. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7) (2003). For criticism of this practice, see Philip G. Schrag, The
Summary Affirmance Proposal of the Board of Immigration Appeals, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 531
(1998).
31. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(0. (2003).
32. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g). (2003).
33. See INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2003) (Judicial orders of removal).
34. INA § 242(b)(4)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D) (2003).
35. See Stuart Grider, Sexual Orientation as Grounds for Asylum in the United States-In re
Tenorio, No. A72 093 558 (EOIR Immigration Court, July 26, 1993), 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 213,
215 (1994).
2004]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court decision would produce erga omnes effects for the entire
immigration system, but, as stated earlier, the Supreme Court has tended
to issue relatively few decisions concerning immigration.
B. THE ASYLUM PROCESS
According to the provisions of Section 208 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), the Attorney General may exercise his or her
discretion to grant asylum to an alien who has arrived or is present,
legally or illegally, in the United States. 36 A successful finding of asy-
lum permits the asylee to remain in the United States and file for adjust-
ment of status to permanent residency after waiting one year. 37  To
achieve success, claimants of asylum must demonstrate that they fit the
INA's definition of the term "refugee."
38
A refugee is defined as a person outside of his country of national-
ity or habitual residence who is unable or unwilling to return due to past
persecution or a reasonable fear of persecution based on the claimant's
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.39 Asylees differ from refugees in that asylees are
already present in or at the border of the United States, while refugees'
claims are assessed outside the United States in a process governed by
Section 207 of the INA.40
The term "refugee" was first defined legally in the United States in
the Refugee Act of 1980.41 The definition is consistent with that
employed by two United Nations treaties, the 1951 Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees42 and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees,43 and reflects the U.S. commitment to international human-
itarian principles. Asylum is completely discretionary and the Attorney
General may deny this form of relief when he or she sees fit to do so;
however, the United States is a signatory to the 1967 Protocol, thus the
Attorney General is bound to refrain from practicing refoulement, which
consists of returning a refugee when the alien's life would be threatened
36. INA §§ 208(a)(1) & (b)(1), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(1) & (b)(1) (2003).
37. INA § 209, 8 U.S.C. § 1159 (2003) (adjustment of status of refugees).
38. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2003).
39. Id.
40. Compare INA § 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (2003) (annual admission of refugees and
admission of emergency situation refugees) with INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2003) (asylum
procedure).
41. Refugee Act of 1980 §201(a), Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. (1980). See also Ellen
Vagelos, The Social Group That Dare Not Speak Its Name: Should Homosexuals Constitute a
Particular Social Group for Purposes of Obtaining Refugee Status? Comment on Re: Inaudi, 17
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 229, 233, 243 (1993).
42. 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
43. 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
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in his or her country of origin. 44 Rates of approval for asylum claims
vary widely from country to country; in FY 2000, for example, 54.8% of
Chinese asylum applicants were successful and 79.0% of Ethiopians
were successful, but only 22.2% of Haitians were successful and a mere
7.9% of Mexicans were successful.45
There are two ways to initiate the asylum process. If an alien has
been placed in removal proceedings, the alien may raise asylum as a
grounds for relief from removal; such an asylum claim is labeled a
"defensive application." 46  Defensive applications can be made in
response to standard removal proceedings47 or the expedited removal
proceeding applied to arriving aliens who lack entry documents or pre-
sent fraudulent documents.48 If the alien is legally present and makes
his or her claim, this type of claim is known as an "affirmative
application. 49
An affirmative asylum applicant will have his or her claim
reviewed by an asylum officer' ° Asylum officers represent a special
subdivision within the immigration system who "receive special training
in international human rights law, nonadversarial interview techniques,
and other relevant national and international refugee laws and princi-
ples." The asylum officer system was created in 1990, and asylum
officers are based in eight offices across the country.5 2 If the asylum
officer determines that the applicant's claim is meritorious, the officer is
authorized to grant asylum to the alien.53 Previously, asylum officers
would also issue denials, with lengthy decision letters explaining the
reason for the denial, and applicants could then renew their claim in
front of an immigration judge if they were ever placed in exclusion or
deportation proceedings.54 Since 1995, however, asylum officers gener-
ally refer claims that are not granted to the immigration courts and
refrain from detailing the reasons for the failure to grant asylum.5 5
44. See IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, supra note 16, at 1020. Nonrefoulement is codified
in INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2003).
45. See 2001 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 23, Table 9.4A at 164.
46. See Vincente A. Tome, Administrative Notice of Changed Country Conditions in Asylum
Adjudication, 27 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 411, 423 (1994).
47. These proceedings are governed by INA §§ 239 & 240, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229 &1229a (2003)
(Initiation of removal proceedings & Removal proceedings).
48. Expedited removal is governed by INA § 235(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) (2003).
49. See Tome, supra note 46, at 422-23.
50. See Alan G. Bennett, The "Cure" That Harms: Sexual Orientation-Based Asylum and the
Changing Definition of Persecution, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 279, 283-84 (1999).
51. 8 C.F.R. § 208.1(b) (2003).
52. See IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, supra note 16, at 1024.
53. See Bennett, supra note 50, at 284.
54. IMMIGRATION AND CrnzENSHIP, supra note 16, at 1025.
55. Id. at 1025-26.
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Unlike affirmative asylum applicants, defensive asylum applicants
begin their asylum procedure before an immigration judge, who controls
the process and makes a ruling on the merits of the alien's claim. 56 The
alien makes known his or her desire to seek asylum at the master calen-
dar, which is the initial appearance in immigration court, and the claim
is addressed subsequently in a hearing on the merits of the claim.57 If
the immigration judge denies the claim for asylum, the alien may seek
review with the BIA, which will hear the appeal if the facts or legal
questions at issue are sufficiently specific.58 If the BIA upholds the
decision of the immigration judge, the alien may then seek review by the
federal Court of Appeal and, ultimately, may petition the Supreme Court
for relief.59
C. HOMOSEXUALITY AND ASYLUM
Until 1990, gay immigrants were categorically barred from entering
the United States. 60 Homosexuals were excluded on the grounds that
were "aliens afflicted with a psychopathic personality, epilepsy or
mental defect."6 Congress clarified its intent to exclude homosexuals
by adding "sexual deviation" to the exclusion grounds in 1965.62 It was
not until the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1990 that homosexual-
ity was finally removed as a bar to admission to the United States.6 3
Also in 1990, the BIA affirmed an immigration judge's decision to
withhold removal of a gay Cuban marielito in In re Toboso-Alfonso.'
Toboso-Alfonso is unique in that it was the first known instance in U.S.
immigration law where a homosexual was cast as a member of a particu-
lar social group, namely that of Cuban gays, and permitted to success-
fully allege persecution on that basis so as to conform with the statutory
definition of refugee in Section 101 of the INA.65 Toboso-Alfonso was
followed by In re Tenorio,66 a 1993 case in which Immigration Judge
Phillip Leadbetter granted asylum to a Brazilian gay man who feared
56. See Tome, supra note 46, at 424.
57. IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, supra note 16, at 1025.
58. See Bennett, supra note 50, at 284.
59. Id. at 285.
60. See Jin S. Park, Pink Asylum: Political Asylum Eligibility of Gay Men and Lesbians under
U.S. Immigration Policy, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1115, 1118 (1995).
61. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163, 182 (1952)
(superceded 1990).
62. Immigration and Nationality Act, amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 15(b), 79 Stat. 911,
919 (1965) (superceded 1990).
63. See Park, supra note 60, at 1119.
64. Int. Dec. 3222 (No. A23-220-644) (BIA Mar. 12, 1990).
65. See Erik D. Ramanathan, Queer Cases: A Comparative Analysis of Global Sexual
Orientation-Based Asylum Jurisprudence, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 22 (1996).
66. In re Tenorio, No. A72-093-558 (Immigration Ct. July 26, 1993).
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persecution as the hands of paramilitary groups after suffering a beating
in Rio de Janeiro as part of a "gay bashing" incident.67 Like Toboso-
Alfonso, Tenorio permitted homosexuality to serve as the basis for
claiming membership in a particular social group that was subject to
persecution.68 Neither Toboso-Alfonso nor Tenorio was, however,
assigned precedential value at the time it was decided.69
Matters were clarified greatly in 1994, when Attorney General
Janet Reno issued a directive mandating that the immigration system
adopt Toboso-Alfonso as precedent "in all proceedings involving the
same issue or issues.'"7 Thus, since the adoption of Toboso-Alfonso as
precedent in 1994, it is clear that foreign gays and lesbians may base
asylum claims on their membership in a particular social group - that
of sexual minorities. Because asylum proceedings are kept confidential,
it is difficult to estimate how many gay men and women have been
granted asylum on the basis of alleged persecution due to their status as
sexual minorities. However, the Washington Post stated that more than
sixty homosexuals had been granted asylum by 1996."' In his article for
the Post, William Branigin noted that successful asylum applications
have been received from homosexuals from Mexico, Colombia, Vene-
zuela, Brazil, Chile, Russia, Romania, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Togo, Iran,
Pakistan, Turkey, Singapore, Lebanon, China, and other nations.72 The
United States is not alone in granting asylum to sexual minorities. Aus-
tralia, Canada, Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, Belgium, Finland, the
United Kingdom, and the Netherlands have also granted asylum to
homosexuals.73
While the designation of Toboso-Alfonso as precedent has elimi-
nated a huge burden for gay and lesbian would-be asylum seekers, since
homosexuals no longer have to argue that they are entitled to claim per-
secution as a member of a particular social group, they are still subject to
the general requirements that all asylum applicants must meet. Namely,
they still must demonstrate the subjective and objective fears of persecu-
tion required by Matter of Acosta,74 and show a nexus between the per-
secution they have suffered or fear they will suffer and their membership
67. See Grider, supra note 35, at 213-14.
68. See Ramanathan, supra note 65, at 22-23.
69. Id. at 20-21.
70. Attorney General Order No. 1895-94, June 19, 1994.
71. William Branigin, Gays' Cases Help to Expand Immigration Rights: More than 60
Homosexuals Claiming Persecution Have Been Granted Asylum in U.S., WASH. POST, Dec. 17,
1996, at Al.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 19 1. & N. 211, 226 (BIA 1985).
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in the particular social group, that of sexual minorities.75 Thus, a gay
alien could not receive asylum by generally asserting that sexual minori-
ties were subject to persecution in his home country; he would have to
additionally demonstrate that he subjectively feared persecution on
account of his homosexuality and that such a fear was objectively rea-
sonable. The Mogharrabi test holds that an alien's fear is reasonable if a
reasonable person in similar circumstances would fear future
persecution.76
D. ASYLUM FOR SEXUAL MINORITIES AND THE GENERAL PROBLEMS
OF THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM
Gays and lesbians seeking asylum are far from immune from the
more general problems that plague the immigration system, namely the
general lack of precedent and the numerous unresolved conflicts
between the circuits. Select prominent examples will serve to illustrate
this problem.
1) Persecutory Vs. Punitive Intent and Pitcherskaia v. INS
A major split between the circuits and the BIA has emerged over
whether an asylum applicant must establish that his or her persecutor
acted with punitive intent. Alla Pitcherskaia is a Russian lesbian who
filed a claim for asylum in 1992; initially, her grounds for filing were
based on her anti-Communist political opinion, but she later expanded
her claim to include persecution based on membership in the particular
social group of Russian gays and lesbians.77 Pitcherskaia testified that
she was repeatedly arrested and charged with "hooliganism," a generic
Russian criminal charge used to detain persons without trial for 10-15
days.78 On one occasion, she stated, she was arrested after protesting the
beating of a gay friend, and another time she was arrested after seeking
the release of the leader of a lesbian youth organization of which she
was a member.79 Pitcherskaia was interrogated about her sexual orienta-
tion when she visited a former girlfriend who was being forcibly
detained in a mental institution and subjected to treatment, including
electric shock therapy, intended to change her orientation."0
75. See B.J. Chisholm, Credible Definitions: A Critique of U.S. Asylum Law's Treatment of
Gender-Related Claims, 44 How. L.J. 427, 433 (2001).
76. See In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. 439, 445 (BIA 1987).
77. See Pitcherskaia v INS, 118 F.3d 641, 643 (9th Cir. 1997). See also Kristie Bowerman,
Pitcherskaia v. INS: The Ninth Circuit Attempts to Cure the Definition of Persecution, 7 LAW &
SEXUALITY 101 (1997), and Bennett, supra note 50.
78. Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 643-44.
79. Id. at 644.
80. Id.
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Pitcherskaia was registered as a suspected lesbian and was ordered
to undergo treatment at a clinic; as a result of the eight therapy sessions
she attended, she was diagnosed with "slow-going schizophrenia" and
was prescribed sedative drugs.8' She continued to receive various
"Demands for Appearance" so that authorities could interrogate her
about her political activities and her sexual orientation, and she was
arrested twice while at the homes of gay friends - in 1990 and 1991 -
and imprisoned overnight.82 The U.S. immigration judge denied her
requests for asylum and withholding of deportation83 and granted her
voluntary departure.84 Pitcherskaia appealed to the BIA.85
A divided opinion from the BIA denied her appeal. 86 The majority
held that she failed to meet her burden to establish eligibility for relief
because she had not shown that she had been persecuted.87 Although
she had been subjected to involuntary psychiatric treatment, the majority
viewed these efforts by the militia and the psychiatric institutions as
efforts to "cure" Pitcherskaia of a disorder, not to punish her, and, absent
some sort of punitive intent at the hands of her persecutors, Pitcherskaia
could not demonstrate past persecution or a reasonable fear of future
persecution were she to return to Russia.88 The BIA acted consistently
with its decision in Matter of Acosta, which held that, among other
factors, an alien seeking asylum must establish that her "persecutor has
the inclination to punish the alien."9
At least two courts of appeals have agreed with the BIA's determi-
nation that persecutors must exhibit an intent to punish. The Seventh
Circuit, in Sivaainkaran v. INS,9 stated that persecution has been
described as "punishment" or "the infliction of harm" for political, relig-
ious, or other offensive reasons.92 The Sivaainkaran court then held that
the Sri Lankan applicant did not merit asylum merely because he feared
harassment from the conflict between the Buddhist Sinhalese and the
81. Id. "Slow going schizophrenia" was a phrase widely employed in Russia to "diagnose"
homosexuals.
82. Id.
83. Withholding of deportation (now withholding of removal) is the term utilized in the
United States for the principle of nonrefoulement. See supra note 44.
84. Voluntary departure is a form of relief that permits an alien to depart voluntarily to a
country of her choice without being subject to a removal order. See INA § 240B, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229c (2003).
85. Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 645.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 19 I & N Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985),
90. Id. at 226.
91. 972 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1992).
92. Id. at 165 n.2.
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Hindu/Muslim Tamils.93
The Fifth Circuit has also required that asylum-seekers meet a puni-
tive intent requirement. In Faddoul v. INS,94 the Fifth Circuit refused to
grant asylum or withholding of deportation to a Palestinian applicant
alleging persecution in Saudi Arabia.95 Faddoul alleged that he and his
family were denied basic living, citizenship, and exit/re-entry privileges,
but the court noted that all non-Saudis were subject to the same lack of
privileges, and Faddoul failed to show that he or his family had been
singled out for persecution or that he would fear harm as a result of a
desire on the part of the Saudis to punish him for a particular belief or
characteristic.96
When Alla Pitcherskaia appealed her denial of asylum to the Ninth
Circuit, however, that Court of Appeal strongly disagreed with the BIA
and the Fifth and Seventh Circuits.97 The Ninth Circuit held that "perse-
cution" is defined objectively as "the infliction of suffering or harm
upon those who differ ... in a way regarded as offensive."98 Thus, the
subjective motives of the persecutor are irrelevant, for "[p]ersecution by
any other name remains persecution." '99 The Ninth Circuit remanded
Pitcherskaia to the BIA for consideration in light of its opinion, con-
cluding with the observation that "[h]uman rights law cannot be side-
stepped by simply couching actions that torture mentally or physically in
benevolent terms such as 'curing' or 'treating' the victims."'"
The Pitcherskaia decision thus means that the BIA may not apply
the punitive intent requirement to defeat asylum claims emanating from
the states in the Ninth Circuit. However, the BIA remains free to apply
the standard to cases emanating from the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, as
well as to the remaining circuits, which have not taken a position on the
issue. Thus, the Ninth Circuit's seemingly fairer and more sensible
position - that persecution should be defined by an objective test
employing a reasonable person standard - governs only within its juris-
diction, whereas the rest of the country seems subject to the punitive
intent requirement. Only through the actions of the Supreme Court or
the independent actions of the other courts of appeals to adopt the hold-
ing of Pitcherskaia will this conflict be resolved. In the interim, homo-
sexuals who claim persecution on the basis of involuntary psychiatric
93. Id. at 165.
94. 37 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 1994).
95. Id. at 188.
96. Id. at 188-89.
97. See Pitcherskaia v INS, 118 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1997).
98. Id. at 647 (citing Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th Cir. 1997)).
99. Id. at 647.
100, Id. at 648.
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treatment are assured that such a legal theory will be upheld as presump-
tively valid in only one of the country's courts of appeals.
2. Homosexual Acts vs. Homosexual Identity and the Definition of
Membership in a Particular Social Group
While the adoption of Toboso-Alfonso as precedent by Attorney
General Reno's directive greatly facilitates the path of a homosexual
seeking asylum on the basis of persecution on account of homosexuality,
it is unclear who exactly is protected by Toboso-Alfonso. An alien who
has lived an openly gay or lesbian lifestyle, such as Pitcherskaia, and
who has been identified as homosexual and harassed or threatened
because of his or her status as a gay man or lesbian seems to quite neatly
fit within the parameters of the ruling. But it is unclear if, for example, a
man who engaged frequently in sexual acts with another man but who
did not hold himself out as gay and lived discreetly would qualify. It is
also uncertain that a prosecution and conviction for violation of a sod-
omy law would rise to the level of persecution necessary to permit a
favorable asylum determination.'"'
While U.S. case law sheds little light on the question, the case law
from other common law countries, particularly the United Kingdom and
Australia, is instructive. A landmark ruling by the House of Lords in
March 1999 established that those persecuted for their sexual identity
would be members of a particular social group and thus be eligible for
asylum in the United Kingdom.° 2 Since the ruling, battered women and
sexual minorities have increasingly sought asylum in Great Britain, with
two gay Jamaican men among the most recent successful applicants.103
However, the distinction between persecution because of one's status as
a homosexual and the prosecution of a homosexual for engaging in
homosexual acts appears to still exist in British law.
The first case presenting a claim for homosexual asylum to the
British courts, Regina v. Binbasi,1°4 clearly considered this distinction
and rejected the claim for asylum of Zia Mehmet Binbasi, a resident of
the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus. The court did not broach the
issue of whether homosexuals constituted members of a particular social
101. See Shelley M. Hall, Quixotic Attempt? The Ninth Circuit, the BIA, and the Search for a
Human Rights Framework to Asylum Law, 73 WASH. L. Rnv. 105, 127-29 (1998) (discussing the
prosecution/persecution controversy in the context of illegal departure).
102. See Sonia Pumell, Gay asylum charter Lords ruling could trigger a flood of claims for
refuge by women and homosexuals, DAILY MAIL, Mar. 26, 1999.
103. See Robin Yapp, Gays' asylum victory; Jamaicans win refugee status after claiming fear
of attacks, DAILY MAIL, Oct. 14, 2002.
104. Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't ex parte Zia Mehmet Binbasi, [1989]
Imm. A.R. 595 (Q. B. Div. July 25, 1989).
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group. Instead, the court noted that "it is clear that in Cyprus there is no
discrimination against homosexuals who are not active." ' 5 While a
Cypriot law criminalizing sodomy and permitting brief imprisonment
did exist, Binbasi could escape prosecution and imprisonment so long as
he did not engage in homosexual activity. 0 6 Binbasi was not at risk for
prosecution or persecution because of his status as a gay man, and, while
his homosexuality might lead him to be the subject of ridicule, that
"degree of discrimination would not be such as to have the quality of
persecution." 10 7
While it might be tempting to ignore Binbasi as outmoded in light
of the successful homosexual asylum claims that have been won in the
United Kingdom since 1999, a 2002 decision by the Court of Appeal
regarding the asylum applications of three gay Zimbabweans suggests
that Binbasi's reasoning may be alive and well. 108 Outrage!, a British
gay rights organization, reports that the Court of Appeal, led by Lord
Justice Schiemann, rejected the asylum claim of the three men, holding
that the criminalization of private, consensual sodomy does not violate
the right to privacy and does not constitute inhuman or degrading treat-
ment.109 The decision makes explicitly clear that homosexuals seeking
asylum in Britain may not base their claims solely on actual or feared
prosecution for sodomy. In other words, a gay man or lesbian's claim
for asylum would also need to contain some sort of component of perse-
cution because of the alien's status as a homosexual, and the decision
would seem to bar the claim of a person who is not openly gay and does
not identify as such, and possibly also the claim of a lesbian who
acknowledges her orientation but has lived very discreetly and is not
known to be a lesbian by the wider community.
Australian case law has also suggested that the ability to live a dis-
creetly homosexual lifestyle might also bar an asylum claim. Like the
United Kingdom, Australia has permitted asylum for homosexuals." 0
The very first published decision in Australia that granted asylum to a
homosexual was explicit that homosexuals constituted members of a
particular social group."1 However, a subsequent decision involving a
105. Id. at 599.
106. Id. at 597.
107. Id. at 497, 500.
108. See Peter Tatchell, Court of Appeal rejects gay asylum: No protection under Refugee
Convention & Human Rights Act, (July 7, 2002), at http://outrage.nabumedia.com/
pressrelease.asp?ID=157.
109. Id.
110. See Decision of Jan. 21, 1994, RRT No. N93/02240 (the first published Australian case,
involving an Iranian, where a homosexual was granted asylum).
111. Id. [55.
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gay Chinese man from Shanghai," 2 which denied the man's claim for
asylum, appears to raise the same sorts of issues that underlay the deci-
sion in Binbasi. While the Australian tribunal noted that the Chinese
record of treatment of its homosexual citizens was not pristine, several
reports suggested that Shanghai was different from the rest of the coun-
try and that "it appears likely that in Shanghai a homosexual who is
discreet in his behavior can avoid the risk of harm."'" 3 Thus, as in Brit-
ain, it seems that only an outspoken, openly gay individual may take
benefit of the determination that homosexuals constitute members of a
particular social group, while those who are discreetly gay and lesbian,
and even those with the mere potential to live discreetly homosexual
lives, will not be able to demonstrate the level of persecution necessary
to secure asylum.
Whether the distinction between persecution because of status ver-
sus prosecution because of act and the related question of the ability to
live a discreet homosexual lifestyle will affect U.S. jurisprudence
remains to be seen. The overruling of Bowers v Hardwick' by the
decision in Lawrence v Texas" 5 obliterates the argument that a gay
applicant could not base an asylum claim on a prosecution for sodomy in
another country because the United States itself permits the criminaliza-
tion of sodomy. However, applicants, such as the Zimbabweans previ-
ously mentioned, would still be far from assured of prevailing on their
asylum claim, given the wide discretion accorded to the immigration
judges and asylum officers. As for the ability of an alien to secure asy-
lum who does not identify as lesbian and lives very discreetly, much
would depend on her ability to cast herself as a member of a particular
social group, homosexual or otherwise, that is subjected to persecution.
Given the lack of consistency among the various circuit courts and the
BIA, the outcome of her claim would be uncertain.
There are no less than three principal definitions of the "particular
social group" enshrined in U.S. law;" 6 additionally, the INS has pro-
posed additional regulations regarding the definition that have yet to be
adopted.' The BIA definition of the social group has the longest his-
tory, as it emerged in 1985 in Matter of Acosta." I 8 The alien in Acosta, a
112. See Decision of June 10, 1994, RRT No. BV93/00242.
113. Id. 168.
114. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia's criminalization of sodomy and held that the
right to privacy does not include consensual sodomy).
115. 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003) (holding Texas's same-sex sodomy law unconstitutional).
116. See Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N. 211 (BIA 1985); Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571
(9th Cir. 1986); Gomez v INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).
117. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588-98 (2000) (to be codified at 8
C.F.R. § 208.15(c))(proposed Dec. 7, 2000).
118. See Acosta, 19 I&N 211.
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Salvadoran taxi driver, was held not to exhibit membership in a particu-
lar social group. The BIA stated that a particular social group is com-
posed of persons who share a "common, immutable characteristic" that
is either "innate" or arises from "shared past experience."'1 9 The char-
acteristic must be one that the group members "cannot change" or be so
"fundamental to their individual identities or consciences" that they
should not be required to change. 2o Because the alien's claim for social
group membership was based on his participation in a taxi cooperative,
his asylum claim was rejected on the rationale that membership in the
taxi cooperative was not immutable or fundamental to his identity or
conscience.' 2' The First Circuit has adopted this definition of social
group membership as well.' 22
The Ninth Circuit enunciated its own definition of the particular
social group in Sanchez-Trujillo v INS.'23 The Ninth Circuit held that a
social group consisted of a group united by a common interest and
emphasized that the associational relationship must be voluntary and
possess a common characteristic that is fundamental to the shared iden-
tity.' 24 The court also implied it would favor a "small, readily identifi-
able group," such as a family, in an attempt to impose a boundary on the
use of the social group.' 25 Both the Acosta tests and Sanchez-Trujillo
tests imply a certain amount of rigidity. Acosta is clearly insistent on
the immutability of the characteristic, while Sanchez-Trujillo is equally
insistent that a voluntary association exist (implying that the members of
the group are aware of their association) and that the group not be
overbroad.
The rigidity of both tests is overcome somewhat by the definition
offered by the Second Circuit. In Gomez v. INS,126 the social group was
defined as "individuals who possess some fundamental characteristic in
common which serves to distinguish them in the eyes of a Persecutor -
or in the eyes of the outside world in general."'2 7 The court also held
that "the attributes of a particular social group must be recognizable and
discrete."''28 Thus, the Gomez definition depends on a more objective
standard than the other two tests. Membership is defined by whether the
persecutor would view the alien as a member of the persecuted group.
119. Id. at 233.
120. Id. at 233-34.
121. Id.
122. See Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir. 1985).
123. See Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
124. Id. at 1576.
125. Id.
126. 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).
127. See id. at 664.
128. Id.
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Unlike in Sanchez-Trujillo, the alien's own self-identification with the
group is irrelevant; clearly, Gomez provides the best support for an alien
who does not identify as homosexual but who is alleging persecution on
account of his participation in "homosexual activities" or even his per-
ceived homosexuality. Gomez also avoids the question of whether
homosexual actions or homosexual identity is an immutable characteris-
tic, a question that the Acosta definition would seem to unearth.
The proposed regulations of Dec. 7, 2000, which have yet to be
adopted, also attempt to update the earlier two definitions. The regula-
tions would characterize a social group as "composed of members who
share a common, immutable characteristic ... that a member either can-
not change or that is so fundamental to the identity or conscience of the
member that he or she not be required to change it."' 129 While the defini-
tion maintains the immutability requirement of Acosta, its mention of
characteristics "fundamental to the identity or conscience" mirrors lan-
guage in the recent Hernandez-Montiel decision, 30 which granted asy-
lum to a gay Mexican with a female sexual identity. Thus, the proposed
regulations provide some assurance that sexual minorities apart from the
openly gay, activist alien would be able to place themselves in a social
group. The proposed regulations also permit consideration of factors
including whether the voluntary associational relationship under the
Sanchez-Trujillo definition exists among the members and whether the
society distinguishes members of the group for different treatment or
status, in keeping with the Gomez definition.' 3'
As with the question of a punitive intent requirement, one of the
definitions of the social group, the Gomez definition, is clearly the most
favorable to all types of sexual minorities seeking asylum in the United
States, for the applicants need only show that they have faced persecu-
tion because the persecutor has perceived that they are members of a
discrete social group. As in the case of Pitcherskaia, however, the BIA
is required to apply the Gomez definition only in the jurisdiction of the
Second Circuit. Thus the definition of the social group, like the question
of punitive intent, will vary from circuit to circuit until either the
Supreme Court accepts a case for review and definitively resolves the
question, or all the circuits independently agree to adopt a standard
definition.
3. Lack of Precedent
While the general lack of legal precedent is perhaps the single
129. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, supra note 115, at 76,598.
130. 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000).
131. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, supra note 115, at 76,598.
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greatest problem facing asylum applicants and other persons navigating
the immigration courts, there is, relatively speaking, little that can be
concluded about this issue, despite its importance. The clashes between
the circuits can be illustrated quite easily because the courts of appeals
publish their decisions, and the competing legal arguments thus can eas-
ily be compared and contrasted. As for the lack of precedent, less can be
said simply because so little case law is released in published opinions,
not all of which are assigned precedential value.
David Parish noted that, "The BIA renders approximately 4,000
decisions yearly, but publishes only about 50."132 As regards asylum
specifically, it was not until 1987, with the release of the Cardoza-Fon-
seca opinion,' 33 that a BIA decision that granted asylum was assigned
precedential value; previously, the only BIA precedents on asylum con-
sisted entirely of denials.' 34 Because the vast majority of cases that
carry the weight of precedent all deny asylum, there is little guidance for
aliens or immigration judges as to what factors are present in a valid
asylum claim. 135
The result of the lack of precedent is clear from the eighteen-month
study that Deborah Anker performed for EOIR hearings at an immigra-
tion court in a major urban setting. 136 The period witnessed the filing of
149 asylum cases; 42 decisions were rendered, and only 7 asylum claims
were granted.1 37 Anker states, "No consistent application or coherent
view of legal doctrine governed the outcome of these decisions; many of
the cases granted were approved on the basis of theories rejected in other
cases in which asylum was denied."' 138
Thus, the immigration system appears to have evolved as a system
divorced from the strict guidelines of precedent and stare decisis that
govern the other realms of American law. While immigration judges
and the members of the BIA must follow Supreme Court and circuit
courts' decisions that are on point, as well as the decisions of the BIA
that are designated as precedent, so relatively few decisions exist, when
viewed in comparison with the other legal fields, that it is difficult for an
alien to argue that Case A with Facts B & C received Decision D and,
since Facts B & C exist in the present case as well, that Decision D
should be reached again. It is as if, in the center of a common law
132. See Parish, supra note 11, at 950 n.152.
133. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
134. See Anker, supra note 10, at 447 n.46.
135. Id. at 461.
136. Id. at 443 n.31 (noting that the court was not identified in order to preserve the anonymity
of the parties involved in the adjudication process).
137. Id. at 444, Table 2.
138. Id. at 452.
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jurisdiction, a quasi-civil law institution has emerged that permits adju-
dicators to decide different outcomes for cases with the same facts.
These different outcomes occur not because immigration judges are
authorized to ignore precedent (to the contrary, INS regulations are
explicit that BIA decisions designated as precedent are "binding on all
officers and employees of the Service or immigration judges"),' 39 but
because so few decisions are recorded and released publicly, let alone
assigned precedential value. Judges simply have precious little in the
way of guidance and, in Anker's view, too often were guilty of "impos-
ing their own cultural and political assumptions in assessing applicants'
credibility, and making implicit political and ideological judgments."' 4 °
Thus, for a homosexual asylum applicant, Toboso-Alfonso,
Tenorio, and Hernandez-Montiel aside, there are really no other cases
that have been published and circulated that provide the gay or lesbian
applicant with a sense of what facts will rise to the level of persecution
and how one can create the nexus between social group membership and
persecution. Moreover, Tenorio is not designated precedent and thus
may serve only as persuasive authority, and the reach of Hernandez-
Montiel is limited to the courts in the Ninth Circuit.
Even the precedential status of Toboso-Alfonso, and therefore the
basic assumption that gays and lesbians constitute members of a particu-
lar social group, seems far from absolute. Attorney General Reno, per
her power in Section 3.1 of Part 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
was clearly authorized to modify the BIA's decision in Toboso-Alfonso
in order to designate it as precedent. 4 ' However, the same section
appears to give the Attorney General the power to overrule any BIA
decision, which would seemingly authorize a later Attorney General to
un-designate Toboso-Alfonso as precedent.' 42 While such a move does
seem unlikely and an Attorney General would likely deem the hallowed-
ness of precedent and legal certainty too great to risk so audacious an
act, the Attorney General's statutory power to overturn any BIA prece-
dent seems apparent, ominously feeding the precedential murkiness of
the immigration system in addition to the more apparent lack of case
law. Moreover, the current Attorney General has shown a clear willing-
ness to overturn the BIA's decisions on numerous occasions. Former
Board Member Lory Rosenberg notes that Attorney General Ashcroft
has overturned more BIA decisions than any other attorney general at
139. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g) (2003).
140. See Anker, supra note 10, at 452.
141. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g) (2003).
142. Id.
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the halfway mark of his or her first term in office. 43 Attorney General
Ashcroft has thus shown a willingness to shape the immigration law as
he sees fit. Whether he would act so brazenly as to upset the holding of
Toboso-Alfonso is another, perhaps unanswerable, question.'44
E. BRIEF CONCLUSIONS
The importance of immigration issues to the present-day American
society is widely apparent. Similarly, the problems inherent within the
immigration legal system are obvious and unavoidable. The lack of pre-
cedent and lingering conflicts between the BIA and the courts of appeal
prevent a uniform application of justice that should not occur when fed-
eral law, as is immigration law, is at play. As cases involving detention
of Muslim aliens and closed hearings for suspected terrorists continue to
wend their way through the legal system, and as ever greater numbers of
sexual minorities flee persecution for the relatively safe haven of the
United States,' 45 the need for the immigration system to reform itself
seems painfully apparent.
The solutions to the two main problems identified in this Comment,
protracted decisional conflicts between the BIA and the courts of
appeals and the general paucity of precedent, seem relatively simple. As
for the conflicts between the circuits and the BIA, the Supreme Court
simply must shed its reticence to address immigration issues and must
act to regularize standards. There is certainly a danger for aliens in
greater uniformity, namely that the unifying body will adopt the most
draconian measures and discard the holdings that are most favorable to
alien applicants. Still, as it stands now, a gay man who has been subject
to forced hospitalization in Country P and who wishes to arrive at a U.S.
port of entry and apply for asylum would clearly benefit by entering in
Los Angeles or Honolulu, so as to assure himself of the benefits of the
favorable Pitcherskaia ruling. Similarly, a woman from Country K who
was involved romantically with another woman and has been detained
repeatedly by the police in her country since ending the relationship
143. Judge Lory Rosenberg, Address to Advanced Immigration Seminar Class at University of
Miami School of Law (Jan. 30, 2003).
144. Recently, it has been reported that Attorney General Ashcroft is considering making
major changes to the regulations regarding gender-based persecution. See George Lardner, Jr.,
Ashcroft Reconsiders Asylum Granted to Abused Guatemalan: New Regulations Could Affect
Gender-Based Persecution, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2003, at A2.
145. But see Lucy Halatyn, Political Asylum and Equal Protection: Hypocrisy of United States
Protection of Gay Men and Lesbians, 22 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. Rav. 133 (1998) and John A.
Russ IV, The Gap Between Asylum Ideals and Domestic Reality: Evaluating Human Rights
Conditions for Gay Americans by the United States' Own Progressive Asylum Standards, 4 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 29 (1998) (both arguing that the United States fails to protect its own
domestic homosexual population as effectively as it grants asylum to foreign gays and lesbians).
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would rationally want to enter the United States in New York or Buffalo
in order to guarantee that she can use the Gomez definition and thus
possibly avoid the question of whether she herself identifies as a lesbian
and simply argue that the police viewed her as such. Rational aliens
would concentrate only in the circuits that tend to produce favorable
immigration decisions, thus limiting the great benefits and burdens of
immigration to a few states.
The solution to the lack of precedent is even clearer. The BIA sim-
ply cannot afford to release so few precedential decisions. For the
immigration judges to properly carry out their duties, they must receive
more guidance in the way of firm law that speaks to the issues they
confront daily. Published denials of claims should not so outweigh pub-
lished grants. Procedures like the unpublished affirmance of immigra-
tion judges' decisions by single members of the BIA obviously reflect
the view that the BIA is overloaded with cases. But the current opacity
of the decision-making process inspires little confidence in the result;
perhaps greater transparency would actually lessen the number of
appeals rather than increase them.
The immigration adjudicatory system is clearly at a crossroads.
Immigration is not likely to recede in importance in the public con-
science any time soon, and, unless reform occurs, the partially broken
system that exists now may become unfixable. The federal court system
must remove the conflicts that apply immigration law unevenly across
the circuits. Similarly, the BIA must discontinue its practice of render-
ing so many of its decisions without written opinion and must allow the
generation of formal precedent that will guide non-citizens and legal
practitioners alike. While immigration law has historically been
estranged from the typical constitutional norms, the heightened impor-
tance of immigration in an increasingly globalized world necessitates
that executive, legislature, and judiciary alike all act to correct the sys-
tem's flaws or else risk a far greater future administrative nightmare.
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